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Collective Interventions After 
Cold War: Reflections on 
U.N. Mission to the Congo, 
1960-64 
John F. Clark, Florida International University 
the 
the 
In Lhe aftermath of the Cold War, the world's states may now be 
prepared the make greater use of collective military forces organized 
through the United Nations to resolve conflicts having both internal and 
international dimensions. Such a step would be in keeping with the 
liberal internationalism generally (if inconsistently) supported by the 
Western democracies in this century. Since the end of the Cold War, 
the UN member states have organized military operations through the 
UN to provide relief to civilian victims of civil strife in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Somalia, as well as rebutting Iraq's aggression in 
Kuwait. Perhaps as meaningfully, the UN Security Council has 
imposed sanctions on the military regime in Haiti for its 
unconstitutional seizure of power despite (a) the apparent absence of an 
international threat to peace and security and (b) the clear control of the 
Haitian state apparatus by the Raoul Cedras government. This latter 
case may signal a shift in the balance of principles in the UN in favor 
of democracy and human rights, and away from the prerogatives of 
sovereignty . 
If such collective interventions are to become common in 
international relations, careful consideration should go into the planning 
and execution of future UN missions. Otherwise, they may fail to 
achieve the ends for which they are designed , and thereby disillusion 
states about the effectiveness of UN action. Accordingly, the end of the 
Cold War is an important time to revisit past UN operations, and, 
hopefully, glean lessons for the present. Among the UN peacekeeping 
missions undertaken since the first in 1956, the UN mission to the 
Congo 1 between 1960-64 has perhaps the most relevance for the 
contemporary world. The UN mission to the Congo, officially known 
by its French name, the Operation des Nations Unies au Congo 
(ONUC), played an important role in the internal Congolese situation 
as well as its international role. Moreover, the ultimate decisiveness of 
1The Congo changed its name to "Zaire " in 1971, but I shall employ its 
older name throughout this paper, which considers only the pre - 1971 
period . 
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the ONUC role in Congo contrasts with the indeterminate role of the 
UN missions to Cyprus and Lebanon. Yet the mixed outcomes that the 
ONUC mission produced in the Congo, as well as the differing values 
of its observers, render it highly controversial to the present day. Here, 
we shall explore the roots of the controversy over the ONUC mission, 
and offer a post-Cold War assessment of the lessons it offers. 
The Genesis of the Mission and the Ambiguity of Its 
Mandate 
The events leading to the ONUC mission burst onto the world 
stage with little warning. After nearly one hundred years of colonial 
rule, Congo received its independence from Belgium on 30 June 1960. 
Elections organized the previous month had resulted in a plurality of 
seats in the National Assembly for the Mouvement National Congolais 
(MNC), led by the strongly nationalist Patrice Lumumba. After some 
maneuvering by the Belgian governor to prevent it, Lumumba became 
Prime Minister, and Joseph Kasavubu, a more cautious and moderate 
leader of the Abako party, was elected President by the National 
Assembly .2 At that time, the Congolese people were deeply divided by 
ethnicity, language, and cultural practice. Moreover, the political 
movements leading to independence had appeared and matured very 
suddenly in the mid-1950s, and the Belgians had done precious little to 
prepare the Congolese for their independence. 3 The lack of a 
politically-prepared elite proved momentous for the fate of the Congo. 
On 4 July 1960, Congolese troops of the Force Publique, Congo's 
national army , began to mutiny against their (Belgian) officers, who 
had remained in their posts after independence.4 The following day the 
2See Hoskyns, pp .74 -77. Abako stands for the "Alliance des 
BaKongo," which was an ethnically -based party for the Kongo people of 
lower Congo . It should be made clear that Prime Minister was the more 
desirable post, one which Kasavubu had sought before Lumumba eventually 
won it. Under the Congolese Loi Fondamentale, the President was 
envisioned to play a mostly ceremonial role, such as the that played by the 
President of Germany in that country 's contemporary political system. 
3The two classic accounts of internal events leading to independence for 
the Congo are Rene Lemarchand, Political Awakening in the Belgian 
Congo, (Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1964) and Crawford Young, 
Politics in the Congo : Decolonization and Independence, (Princeton: 
Princeton Univ . Press, 1965). Notable in the lack of colonial preparation 
was the virtual absence of any opportunity for the Congolese to attain a 
university -level education until the very end of the 1950s. 
4Two chronologies of events in the Congo during this period are very 
useful in tracing events. See Wynfred Joshua, United Nations Peacekeeping 
in the Congo , 1960-1964, Vol. 4, A Congo Chronology, 1960 -1964, 
(Washington : Brookings, 1966) and Howard M. Epstein, Revolt in the 
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Belgian commander, General Emile Janssens, addressed the troops in 
Leopoldville, and rejected out of hand their demands for reorganization 
of the army.5 Later that day, the mutiny spread to other Congolese 
cities, and some Europeans were attacked by the Congolese soldiers. 
With the mutinies and scattered attacks on Europeans continuing, the 
Belgian government decided to use its troops to restore order in the 
Congo. On 10 July Belgian troops from within the Congo and flowin 
in from Belgium began to intervene against the mutinous troops.6 
This action infuriated Kasavubu and Lumumba, and had the immediate 
effect of intensifying the mutinies and attacks on Europeans. 7 They 
also led various Congolese authorities to begin a series of calls for 
outside assistance, from the U.S. (July 12th), the UN (July 12th and 
13th), Ghana (July 13th) and the Soviet Union (July 14th). 
One should also recall another dimension of the Congo crisis with 
which the UN soon became involved, the secession of Katanga. 8 
Katanga (now Shaba) is the southern-most, mineral-rich, province of 
the Congo that has served as the country's main source of wealth. In the 
late 1950s, a political party called Conakat [Confederation des 
Associations Tribales du Katanga] was organized in the province to 
represent the interests of the "authentic Katangans," i.e., those groups 
which had long inhabited the region.9 This party was also closely tied 
to conservative Belgian commercial interests in Katanga. These foreign 
interests, and their traditional African partners in Katanga, including 
Conakat, favored strong local autonomy, if not outright independence 
for Katanga. In the May 1960 elections in the Congo , Conakat won 
Confo , 1960-64, (New York: Facts on File, 1965). 
Among the demands of the soldiers were the Africanization of the 
officer corps and increases in salary for African soldiers. In the course of 
his speech, Janssens wrote the phrase "Before independence = after 
independence" on a blackboard. See Catherine Hoskyns, The Congo Since 
Independence : January 1960 to December 1961, (London: Oxford Univ . 
Press, 1965), p.88 . 
6Under a Belgo -Congolese Treaty of Friendship which had been 
negotiated but not yet ratified, the Belgians were allowed to keep their 
troops stationed at two sites in the Congo, specifically, at Kitona (near 
Leor,oldville, the capital) and Kamina (in northern Katanga province) . 
See Hoskyns, pp.122-24 . 
8The best single source on the secession specifically is Jules Gerard -
Libois, Katanga Secession, trans . Rebecca Young, (1963; trans. Univ . of 
Wisconsin Press, 1966). 
9Gerard-Libois, pp .11-12; the major groups that Conakat claimed to 
represent were the Lunda, Baluba -Katanga, Bayeke, Basanga, Tshokwe, 
Batabwa, and Babemba. Conakat represented those in these ethnic groups 
who wished to distinguish themselves from the "outsiders" (the Baluba -
Kasai and Lulua), i.e ., those who had emigrated into Katanga from 
neighboring Kasai over the previous decades . 
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twenty-five (of sixty) seats in the provincial Assembly, and later won 
the loyalty of thirteen independent representatives, giving it control 
over the body. 10 On 16 June Moi"se Tshombe, the son-in-law of the 
Lunda paramount chief, was voted President of the provincial 
Assembly . Tshombe had already hinted in April that Katanga might 
declare itself independent, and following disputes with Lumumba over 
the formation of the central Congolese government, he declared Katanga 
independent on 11 July. ll 
In retrospect, one cannot help but be struck by the great rapidity 
with which the ONUC mission was organized and dispatched. This 
development reflects the great urgency that the major parties, including 
UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, felt in initiating the 
mission . The Congolese (and Soviets) were anxious for the Belgian 
troops to be withdrawn immediately because of the affront to Congolese 
sovereignty it entailed; meanwhile the Western states supported an 
immediate dispatch of UN troops both to protect Western lives and 
property, and to eliminate any excuse for Soviet counter-intervention. 
In response to Hammarskjold's call, the Security Council convened on 
13 July, and passed a resolution the following day calling on Belgium 
to withdraw its forces, and authorizing the Secretary-General to organize 
a military force to be sent to the Congo in support of its government. 
Due to the controversy it generated, one should be aware of the exact 
wording of the key (second) activating clause of this resolution: 
[The Security Council] f d]ecides to authorize the 
Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in 
consultation with the Government of the Republic of 
the Congo, to provide the Government with such 
military assistance as may be necessary until, through 
the efforts of the Congolese Government with the 
technical assistance of the United Nations, the 
national security forces may be able, in the opinion 
of the Government, to meet fully their tasks; 12 
Only one day later, 15 July, the first UN -commanded troops, from 
Tunisia and Ghana , arrived in the Congo. Then, on the following day, 
Guinean, Moroccan, Ethiopian and more Tunisian troops were flown 
into the Congo to serve under the UN banner. By 17 July there were 
10Hoskyns, p.71. 
11Gerard -Libois, pp.68 and 109. The Katangan Assembly later approved 
this declaration on 17 July 1960. 
12U.N . Security Council Resolution S/4387 (14 July 1960) . The 
Resolution was adopted by a vote of eight in favor to none against, with 
three abstentions (China, France and the U.K.). 
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some 3,500 UN-commanded troops in the Congo. 13 
The drawback of organizing and dispatching the ONUC with such 
great haste, however, was a lack of concurrence over the real mandate of 
the mission, which plagued it throughout its existence. Since there was 
little time to resolve the issues surrounding the mission's purpose, the 
Resolution authorizing the mission was worded vaguely, so as to 
ensure both Western and Soviet support. 14 As Tunisian Security 
Council representative Mongi Slim observed at the time, 
The text [of the Resolution] is intentionally 
imprecise about certain points in order to avoid 
arguments in the Council which might prolong the 
debate and delay the decision which is so vital in the 
present situation and which has been expressly 
requested by the Government of the Congo.15 
Secretary-General Hammarskjold was also aware, of course, that the 
Resolution was vague, 16 but he intended to use his own diplomatic 
skill to conduct the ONUC mission in such a way as to restore order in 
the Congo without further unilateral intervention. 
From the Congolese perspective, the real principle at stake was 
that of Congolese sovereignty, and hence the real issue was the 
unilateral intervention of Belgian forces in Congolese territory. This 
was as much the view of Kasavubu and other "moderates" as it was of 
the fiery Lumumba. In the view of Kasavubu and Lumumba, it was 
they who had aroused the UN's interest in the Congo, specifically by 
sending two telegrams to Hammarskjold on 12 and 13 July, 
respectively. 17 According to the request made in the first telegram, 
"The essential purpose of the requested military aid is to protect the 
national territory of the Congo against the present external aggression 
which is a threat to international peace." Though this sentence seems to 
make the nature of the request clear, Kasavubu and Lumumba further 
13
"First Report of the Secretary -General on the Implementation of the 
July 14, 1960, Security Council Resolution," July 18, 1960, U.N. 
Document S/4389, Security Council Official Records [SCOR], Supp. for 
July-September, 1960, p.22. 
14Of the dozens of scholarly studies of the Congo crisis and the ONUC 
mission, that of Paul-Henry Gendebien L'intervention des Nations Unies au 
Congo, 1960-1964, (Paris: lnstitut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales 
Universite Lovanium de Kinshasa, 1967), pp.38 -41) best recognizes the 
importance of the ambiguity of the original resolutions authorizing the 
U.N. mission . Cf. on this point, Hoskyns, p.117. 
15SCOR , 873rd meeting, 13/14 July 1960, ~211. Cf. Hoskyns, p.117 . 
16Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjold, (New York: Knopf, 1972), p.403. 
17These were circulated at the U.N. as Document S/4382. 
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stressed the same point in their subsequent telegram, indicating that 
"the purpose of the aid requested is not to restore the internal situation 
in Congo but rather to protect the national territory against acts of 
aggression committed by Belgian metropolitan troops." 18 The first 
telegram had also expressed the Congolese suspicion that Belgium was 
behind the secession of Katanga. As for the attacks on Europeans, the 
Congolese stressed the fact that the great majority of these attacks 
occurred only after the Belgian intervention. Needless to say, the 
Soviets backed the Congolese view of the need for countervailing 
intervention to restore Congolese sovereign rights.19 
Recounting hair-raising accounts of the rape of European women 
and other misdeeds of the mutinous Congolese soldiers, a Belgian 
witness to the first Security Council debate on the Congo crisis stressed 
the humanitarian nature of Belgian intervention. Henry Cabot Lodge, 
speaking for the U.S., was more conciliatory, praising the "popularly-
elected, duly constituted" Government of the Congo for its efforts "to 
restore peace, security and tranquility in the country. "20 Yet Lodge 
echoed other Western countries in the contention that the Security 
Council session had been convened by the Secretary-General, and not by 
the Congolese themselves. 21 This claim reinforced the Western view 
that the real purposes of the UN mission were to (1) restore order to the 
country and (2) prevent any further unilateral intervention in the Congo 
by other powers. Without being abrasive, Lodge stated the U.S. view 
that no aggression had taken place, and he emphasized the unacceptable 
loss of life in the Congo, which he said was in a state of "near-
anarchy. "22 Lodge certainly sympathized with the view later expressed 
by the French delegate that the Belgian intervention was in accord with 
the "principle of international law" that accepted "intervention on 
humanitarian grounds." 23 Thus, the role of the UN forces was to 
replace the Belgian troops and restore order. 
Meanwhile, Hammarskjold's position, which was a complex, even 
18Emphasis added. 
19See SCOR , 873rd meeting, 13/14 July 1960, 199-108. 
20Ibid ., 192-98. 
21The first U.N. debate on the Congo opened with a protracted 
discussion of whether the Congo's appeals to Hammarskjold should be 
included on the provisional agenda. The Congolese, it seems, had made an 
error of protocol in addressing their telegrams to Hammarskjold rather than 
to the President of the Security Council. Consequently, it was technically 
Hammarskjold himself , rather than the Congolese, who called for the first 
Security Council meeting. 
22Ibid., p. 95. One should perhaps note that the initial Resolution on 
the Congo situation does not condemn Belgium for aggression, but it does 
call on Belgium to withdraw. However, it does not call for an "immediate " 
withdrawal as the Soviets and Congolese requested . 
23/bid., p. 144. 
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tortured vision of the UN's mandate in the Congo, represented a middle 
ground between these two views. In his statement in the Security 
Council's first debate, HammarskjlHd declared that the UN should base 
its response to the Congo crisis on the successful UNEF mission to the 
Middle East after the Suez war in 1956, which was described in a report 
that he himself had written. 24 The Secretary-General argued that the 
mission would have to respect certain principles, including these 
requirements for the UN force: (1) that the mission would be composed 
of personnel from neutral countries only; (2) that the mission would 
only be allowed to use force in self-defense; and (3) that the mission 
would not take actions that made it party to any internal disputes. 
Hammarskj6ld's hope was that the ONUC could restore order to the 
Congo, which would allow Belgian forces to withdraw, and for Katanga 
to be re-incorporated. This, in Lum, would prevent further unilateral 
interventions. 
Regarding the political disposition of UN forces in the Congo, 
Hammarskjold acknowledged in his first report on the ONUC mission, 
dated 14 July, that the ONUC mission was "dispatched to the Congo at 
the request of the Government and will be present in the Congo with its 
consent ... " He further stated that its authority "cannot be exercised 
within the Congo either in competition with representatives of the host 
Government or in co-operation with them in any joint operation. "25 
Legally, Hammarskjold was treading a narrow path as well. As 
Kasavubu and Lumumba's original complaints were made to 
HammarskjlHd rather than directly to the Council, they were not 
included as an agenda item at the initial debate. Moreover, the Council 
"did not endorse the accusation of aggression against Belgium and did 
not call for the setting up of an emergency force Lo protect the Congo 
against the Belgian forces."26 Accordingly, Hammarskjold regarded the 
UN action as being taken under Article 40 of the Charter, which simply 
allowed the Security Council to "call upon the parties concerned [in a 
dispute] to comply with such provisional measures as it deems 
necessary or desirable. "27 The implication of this interpretation is that 
the UN was not taking a legally enforceable decision against a declared 
Belgian aggression. At the same time, Hammarskj6ld made it clear that 
24 /bid ., p. 28. (Hammarskjold 's full comments are contained in p. 18-
29.) The report is called "Summary Study on the Experience derived from 
the Establishment and Operation of the [U.N. Emergency] Force: Report of 
the Secretary-General," General Assembly Official Record Document 
N3943 . For analysis of Hammarskjold's position see especially Arthur Lee 
Bums and Nina Heathcote, Peace-Keeping by UN . Forces: From Suez to the 
Con;o, (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp.24-28. 
2 SCOR S/4389 (see note 13, supra), p. 7 and 12, respectively. 
26Hoskyns, p.120; Cf., Bums and Heathcote, p.26. 
270n this point compare the two sources cited immediately above. 
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Article 2(7) of the Charter, which prohibited the UN from intervening 
"in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state ... " stilJ applied to the Congo. 
Critical reflection on the position of Hammarskjold reveals a great 
many contradictions in the internal logic of his view of the ONUC's 
mandate, not to mention its contradictions with the Soviet and Western 
views. First, Hammarskjold explicitly based the mandate on the 
precedents of the UN missions to Egypt and Lebanon, which "from a 
legal point of view [were] concerned only with questions of foreign 
intervention and international boundaries."28 Yet there were already two 
internal dimensions to the Congo crisis, namely the military mutinies 
and the Katanga secession. It should be quite obvious to even the 
weakest reasoning that the UN force could not at once provide the 
Congolese Government "with such military assistance as may be 
necessary until . . . the national security forces [can] ... meet fully 
their tasks" and stay neutral in internal Congolese disputes . 
Hammarskjold's view of the UN mission called for neutrality, while 
UNSC Resolution S/4387 instructed him to organize a UN force to 
help the Congolese Government perform the tasks which, "in the 
opinion of the Government," were necessary. Clearly, the first tasks of 
any government is to protect itself from foreign invasion and to 
maintain the territorial integrity of the state, so it is perfectly 
reasonable that the Congolese considered the withdrawal of Belgium and 
the restoration of its sovereignty over Katanga as its first priorities. 
In the face of Hammarskjold's failure to reconcile these 
contradictions, the various parties to the dispute continued to press for 
their own views of the ONUC's mandate throughout its existence. One 
has to acknowledge, however, that operative clause 2 of S/4387 is 
much closer to the Congolese -Soviet interpretations than to the 
Western one. 
Outline of Subsequent Outcomes in the Congo in View of 
the ONUC 
Here we shall summarize the course of the ONUC mission with 
reference to its mandates. A number of important developments in the 
Congo with relevance to the performance of the ONUC are also 
sketched, without judgment to their cause or meaning . A full 
evaluation of the ONUC mission is made in the following section. 
Let us begin with the question of the withdrawal of the Belgian 
forces . Belgian forces were withdrawn from all parts of the Congo 
except Katanga with reasonable speed, as UN forces arrived to replace 
them and protect civilians. By 23 July, the Belgian forces had been 
28Hoskyn s, p .121. 
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withdrawn to their Treaty bases or to Belgium, except in Katanga.29 In 
Katanga, though, some 500 Belgian combat soldiers remained until the 
first week in September. Significantly, the Belgian troops there took 
firm steps to suppress forces of the Armee Nationale Congolaise 
(ANC) 30 which had remained loyal to the central government during 
this period, enabling Tshombe to consolidate military control. As 
Hoskyns noted, "These [loyal ANC] troops were not disorderly; they 
had merely refused to surrender." 31 In addition, some 250 Belgian 
officers stayed on in Katanga after September, and some thirty to forty 
remained after the beginning of 1961.32 Finally, some 300 foreign 
mercenaries were recruited by the Katangan government for service in 
1960-61, many of whom were Belgian.33 Most observers agree that 
Tshombe's regime would never have maintained its independence for so 
long with this outside support 34 
In regard to the restoration of order to the Congo, one should 
distinguish between the immediate outcome of the UN's entry and the 
longer term. In the short term, relative order returned to the Congo, 
especially defined as the provision of safety to European and African 
civilians. This is not to say, of course, that lives were not lost in the 
ensuring political tumult, but only that civil order was generally 
reestablished. 
In the larger context the Congo continued to be plagued by grave 
political unrest during the whole 1960-64 period. First, there was a 
breakdown -- or bifurcation -- of the central Congolese government 
itself. On 5 September, following growing disputes over the UN 
operation and other issues, Kasavubu announced the dismissal of 
Lumumba. Lumumba rejected this measure, however, and declared 
Kasavubu dismissed. Though Lumumba certainly lacked authority to 
take this step, Congo's Loi Fondamenta/e was unclear on Kasavubu's 
rights, and a vote of Assembly showed that most of the Congolese 
political class still supported Lumumba. 35 Subsequently, most of the 
government came to support one side or the other. It was at this early 
stage that Joseph Mobutu first entered the Congolese political scene, by 
"neutralizing" both Kasavubu and Lumumba, and putting in place an 
29Epstein, pp.14-15 and 19. 
3
°The new name for the Congolese national army, adopted shortly after 
independence . 
31op . cit., p .142. 
32Hoskyns, p.384 . According to Connor Cruise O'Brien, To Katanga 
and Back : A UN Case History, (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1962), 
p.197, these Belgian officers remained in Katanga with the approval of the 
Belfian government. 
3O'Brien, pp.197 and 199. 
34We shall return to the Katanga question momentarily. 
35 See Hoskyns, pp.206 and 208-210. 
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interim "collegial" regime.36 
After Lumumba's murder in Katanga in January 1961,37 his 
supporters, including especially Antoine Gizenga and Christophe 
Gbenye, carried on a struggle in the Orientale province in Lumumba's 
name until 1964. Another, Maoist, revolutionary, Pierre Mulele, 
conducted a parallel insurgency in the Kwilu district of the Bandundu 
province at the same time. 38 Political order was not really re-
established in the Congo until after Mobutu's November 1965 coup. 
As noted above, the ONUC was charged with maintaining 
neutrality and cooperating with the Congolese government while 
accomplishing its tasks. In regard to the UN's cooperation, Congolese 
authorities rarely felt that the ONUC was cooperating with it. For 
instance, soon after the ONUC's arrival, a detachment of Ghanaians, 
commanded by a British general, began to disarm Congolese troops in 
Leopoldville. In Lumumba's eyes, this was not only lack of 
cooperation , but an outright violation of Congolese rights, and he 
protested to the President of the Security Council in an official letter.39 
By far the most irritating failure of the UN mission from Lumumba's 
perspective, though, was its dealings with the secessionist Tshombe 
regime. 40 In keeping with his reading of the original S/4387 
Resolution, Lumumba had expected the UN to help his government 
expel the Belgians and re-establish control in Katanga. Instead, 
Hammarskjold began patient negotiations with Tshombe. When 
Hammarskjold passed through Leopoldville on his way to Katanga 
without stopping to consult Lumumba in mid-August, the Congolese 
Prime Minister lost all faith in the UN mission, and communications 
between Hammarskjold and Lumumba completely broke down.41 
Yet, Congolese dissatisfaction with the UN mission was hardly 
36See Ibid., pp.210 -17. 
37 See below for more details . 
380n these revolts see R. C. Fox, W de Cramer and J. M. Ribeaucourt , 
"The Second Independence: A Case Study of the Kwilu Rebellion in the 
Congo," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 8 (1965), Crawford 
Young, "Significance of the 1964 Rebellion ," in Helen Kitchen (ed.), 
Footnotes to the Congo Story, (New York: Walker and Co., 1967), and 
Stephen R. Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960-1964, 
(Ithaca : Cornell Univ. Press, 1974), pp .190-216. 
39 UNSC Document S/4414, "Letter Dated 31 July from the Prime 
Minister of the Republic of the Congo to the President of the Security 
Council." 
40 See Hoskyns, pp.162-78 and Madeleine Kalb, The Congo Cables: The 
Cold War in Africa from Eisenhower to Kennedy. (New York: Macmillan, 
1982), pp.47 -50. 
41See Urquhart, pp.428-29 . In tum, Hammarskjold was "clearly angry" 
and "felt personally insulted" by Lumumba's tone in the meeting that took 
place after Hammarskjold's return . See Hoskyns, p.174 . 
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Lumumba's alone; Kasavubu, Mobutu and others were equally disap-
proving of UN activities in the Congo, concerning Katanga as well as 
many other issues. For instance, HammarskjcHd's third Special 
Representative in the Congo, Rajeshwar Dayal, had to be replaced 
because of the UN's policies during his tenure in 1960-61.42 
As for maintaining neutrality, this charge became much more 
difficult to perform after the split between Kasavubu and Lumumba in 
September 1960. It was difficult enough to maintain neutrality 
between a central government and wayward province, but quite 
impossible to maintain it between competitors for control at the center. 
In the event, Andrew Cordier had just arrived at the end of August to 
replace Hammarskjold's original lieutenant in the Congo, Ralph 
Bunche, when this crisis broke. In the aftermath of Kasavubu's 
announcement dismissing Lumumba, Cordier took two decisions that 
he putatively thought to be "neutral" ones, in the best interest of the 
situation as a whole: he closed Congo's major airports and he closed 
the Leopoldville radio station. In fact, both of these decisions worked 
against Lumumba. Since Kasavubu had an ethnic base of supporters in 
Leopoldville, he did not require outside support, but Lumumba could 
have gained from flying in supporters from outside. Secondly, 
Lumumba's prowess as an orator was legendary, and there is a real 
chance that he could have prevailed on the masses for support, given 
access to the radio .43 Moreover, Kasavubu's forces could make use of 
the radio station across the Congo River in Brazzaville, where the 
conservative regime of Fulbert Youlou was in power.44 Cordier's brief 
tenure of a few days as the UN's chief representative in the Congo 
proved crucial because of the close collaboration between Cordier and 
conservative Congolese politicians.45 Later, when Lumumba was put 
42 See particularly p.210ff and Chapter 13 of Dayal's memoir, Mission 
for Hammarskjold : The Congo Crisis, (Princeton : Princeton Univ. Press, 
1976). Also see Kasavubu's letters to Hammarskjold dated 22 February 
1961 (U.N. Document S/4743) and 6 March 1961 (U.N. Document S/4752), 
which expresses the former's dismay over certain provisions of the Security 
Council's Resolution of 21 February 1961 (S/4691) and speculation that the 
U.N. would take over the A.N.C. 
43 Later, while under arrest at the Thysville military base, Lumumba 
persuaded his jailers to release him. 
44On both these points, see Hoskyns, p.204. 
45 See Carole Collins, "Fatally Flawed Mediation: Cordier and the 
Congo Crisis of 1960," Africa Today, 39, 3 (1992), pp .5-22; the 
appearance of this article is illustrative of the continuing fascination and 
controversy surrounding the ONUC mission. As Thomas Kanza, Lumumba's 
capable U .N. ambassador noted , "Cordier's presence in Leopoldville 
presaged a whole new tum of events in the Congo, and certainly not one 
that would be to the advantage of Lumumba . . . " [From The Rise and Fall of 
Patrice Lumumba : Conflict in the Congo, 3rd. ed . Cambridge, Mass .: 
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under house arrest by Kasavubu, UN troops had to surround his house 
to prevent him from being arrested or killed. These events are 
illustrative of the impossibility of UN neutrality in Congo's internal 
politics. 
Another implied charge of the ONUC mission was to prevent 
further outside intervention, especially by the superpowers, and to thus 
to avert another Cold War crisis. This responsibility was best reflected 
in the second operative clause of the Security Council's second 
resolution on the Congo (S/4405), passed on 22 July 1960. This 
clause requested all states 
to refrain from any action which might tend to 
impede the restoration of law and order [in the Congo] 
... and also to refrain from any action which might 
undermine the territorial integrity and the political 
independence .. . of the Congo. 
The debate on this Resolution made it clear that the two Cold War 
antagonists were calling for mutual restraint from unilateral 
intervention, as well as indirectly condemning the continuing Belgian 
presence in Katanga. The same principle was tacitly part of the 
superpower support of the previous Resolution on the Congo. 
In the event, both superpowers became involved in the Congo 
situation outside the ONUC context, and the crisis became the source of 
a major confrontation between them. To begin with the Soviets, their 
growing disillusionment with the ONUC mission parallelled that of 
their would-be client , Lumumba. The Soviets, in keeping with their 
view of the ONUC mandate, were enraged by what they perceived as the 
slow pace of Belgian withdrawal, the lack of cooperation of UN 
authorities with Lumumba, and the ONUC's tardiness in dealing with 
Tshombe. The Soviets were aware of how dependent the UN mission 
was on American support, despite the fact that the troops came from 
neutral countries, and one month after the ONUC inception, they were 
complaining that "the prestige of the UN is being trampled in the 
mud. "46 At the Fourth Security Council session dealing with the 
Congo situation and the ONUC, the Soviets expressed total 
consternation with Hammarskjold's conduct in the Congo, particularly 
his negotiations with the rebellious Katangans, echoing the speeches of 
Schenkman, 1979), p.276.] Kanza argues (p.283) that Cordier's influence 
was important in encouraging Kasavubu to act against Lumumba on 5 
September. 
46 CurrenJ Digest of the Soviet Press, [CDSPJ. vol. XII, no.31, "Masks 
Are Off: Warfare of North Atlantic 'Democrats ' for Black Slavery," [3 
August 1960 Pravda article]. 
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Gizenga, representing the Congo, and a delegate representing Guinea.47 
From this point on, the Soviets withdrew all support from the ONUC 
and increasingly saw the UN mission as an extension of American 
policy in the Congo. In fact, the Soviets soon began a long, tough 
campaign against the UN, including their now-famous "troika 
proposal," under which the Secretary-General was to be replaced by a 
committee of three persons, representing Western, East bloc and non-
aligned interests, respectively.48 
This disillusionment led the Soviets to respond to a request made 
by Lumumba for unilateral Soviet aid. In late August Khrushchev 
ordered approximately ten Soviet IL-14 transport planes with their 
crews, technicians, translators, and equipment to the Congo.49 On 24 
August Lumumba demanded control of the airport at Stanleyville, his 
base of support, from UN forces. Having stopped in a number of 
locations along the way (including Cairo, where the planes may have 
taken on their arms and ammunition after being inspected in Greece), 
the planes landed in Stanleyville on the night of 30 August. 
Lumumba's immediate end in requesting the Soviet aircraft, pilots and 
arms was to use them to put down the secessionist rebellion in 
Katanga, and another that later erupted in Kasai province . Lumumba 
had hoped that such successes would in tum establish his legitimacy 
throughout the Congo, hasten the Belgian withdrawal and thereby render 
the UN presence irrelevant. Unfortunately for him, though, the march 
he ordered on Katanga disintegrated into ethnic warfare, in which some 
200 BaLuba were murdered .50 Moreover, the desperate move turned 
Kasavubu against Lumumba and goaded the U.S. into more vigorous 
action to eliminate the fiery Congolese Prime Minister from the scene. 
Later, in December 1960 when Lumumba was under arrest, Gizenga set 
up a parallel government for Congo in Stanleyville in Lumumba's 
name, to which the Soviets also sent limited aid.51 
47 Hoskyns , pp.175 -78; all of the other Security Council members 
declared (except Poland) themselves supportive of Hammarskjold, but, 
according to Hoskyns, (p.178) Ceylon and Tunisia, the two neutral powers 
present "had serious doubts about his policies ," despite their public 
support. 
48 See especially Kalb, pp.109 -27 on these events . 
49 Kalb, p.58. (The U.S. learned of this Soviet move soon afterwards 
when the Soviets asked Greece for permission for their cargo planes to land 
and refuel in Greece, or to overfly Greek territory, while carrying food to the 
Congo .) The actual number of Soviet planes sent to the Congo is a matter 
of some question . The confusion arises from the fact that two sets of Soviet 
aircraft are in question : those already in the Congo in support of the U.N . 
mission, and those sent surreptiously at the end of August. For some of the 
various numbers given by different sources , see Kalb, fn.6, p.406 . 
50Hoskyn s, p .194; Kalb, pp.68 -70 . 
51See Kalb, pp.169, 217-18 and 223 . 
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The U.S. began interfering in Congolese politics in a low-level 
fashion virtually from the moment that Lumumba took power.52 The 
American ambassador in the Congo, Clare Timberlake, was a confirmed 
anti-communist who viewed Lumumba as a potential dupe of the 
Soviet Union in Africa. Timberlake encouraged Lumumba's 
opponents, including Kasavubu, in their campaigns against him, 
especially after the Hammarskjold-Lumumba split. It was also 
confirmed in 1975, after many years of speculation, that the American 
Central Intelligence Agency had specific plans to assassinate 
Lumumba. 53 The plans had initially called for activities to undermine 
Lumumba politically (such as bribing Congolese politicians to 
withdraw support from Lumumba), but when these failed, a firm 
assassination plot was devised. According to the Church Committee 
report, "The chain of events revealed by the documents and testimony is 
strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the plot to 
assassinate Lumumba was authorized by President Eisenhower 
[himself]." 54 Though the exact circumstances of Lumumba's murder 
after being flown to Elizabethville (Katanga) in January 1961 remain 
controversial, it appears that he was killed by Katangan gendarmes not 
under CJ.A. direction.55 
In a more general way, the Soviets and many Congolese believed 
that the ONUC operated in a fashion that served U.S. interests, rather 
than according to its mandate. This was more true at some times (as 
during Cordier's brief tenure in the Congo) than it was at others (as 
when Dayal served as the UN's Special Representative). After John 
Kennedy became President in the U.S., American interference with UN 
52The works most critical of U.S. policy in the Congo, and most 
specific about U.S. misdeeds in the country in the early periods are those of 
Weissman, Kalb and Collins, all cited above. 
53See U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Government Operations 
with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee), Alleged 
Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, 94th Congress, 1st Sess., 
1975 . 
54/bid., p.51. 
55The American role in Lumumba's murder also remains controversial. 
Lumumba was sent to Elizabethville by Kasavubu's government after he had 
once escaped from detention at the Thysville base, and headed off towards 
his base in Stanleyville, rallying Congolese to his cause along the way. 
The U.S. Embassy in Leopoldville was urging Lumumba's re-arrest and 
confinement in a safer location at that time. On the other hand, the CIA 
station chief in Elizabethville was genuinely surprised when Lumumba was 
brought to Katanga as a prisoner. It is unclear whether the Leopoldville 
authorities who affected Lumumba's second arrest intended for him to be 
killed or not. It was apparently Tshombe's forces who actually murdered 
Lumumba . See Kalb, pp .128-96, Hoskyns, pp.301 -337, Lefever, p.51, and 
O'Brien, pp.96-97. 
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activities diminished, but then increased again after Lyndon Johnson 
assumed office in December 1963.56 
In Congolese politics itself, the U.S. became increasingly 
influential during the years of the UN presence. Kennedy's 
administration labored to restore parliamentary government in the 
Congo, helping to win support for the regimes of Joseph Ileo, and then 
Cyrille Adoula, who succeeded Lumumba as Prime Minister in the 
First Republic. As one observer put it, "The American government not 
only supported Adoula; it was, in many ways, part of his 
government. "57 During these years the U.S. gave substantial economic 
and military aid to the succeeding Congolese governments, with which 
they fought the Lumumbist rebels and bought political support for 
themselves. 58 Later, when the forces of Gbenye seized Stanleyville and 
took some 300 Western hostages, American planes flew in Belgian 
troops to save them and crush the last serious attempt to establish a 
Lumumbist regime in the Congo.59 
In sum, then, the ONUC did not serve to prevent a superpower 
confrontation over the Congo crisis . Rather, it became intertwined in a 
superpower struggle for influence in the Congo lasting over several 
years. We shall further evaluate the meaning of these events below. 
Another of the ONUC's mandates, to restore Congolese 
sovereignty in Katanga, was, as noted above, in dispute. While 
Lumumba was in power, the Western powers, including the U.S., took 
the view that this task should only be carried out by negotiation (in 
keeping with Harnmarskjiild's determinations not to use force, except in 
self-defense, or to become party to "internal disputes"). In any case, this 
task was not a priority for the UN. In the course of 1961, however, as 
a relatively stable and pro-Western government was established in 
Leopoldville, neutralist and moderate Western pressures for the UN to 
take action in Katanga grew. In February 1961, following Lumumba's 
death, and in the face of the continuing presence of the Belgian military 
personnel in Katanga, the Security Council passed another resolution 
on Congo explicitly and forcefully requiring a complete withdrawal of 
"all Belgian and other foreign military and para-military personnel and 
political advisers" from Katanga. 60 Hammarskjold then appointed 
Connor Cruise O'Brien , who was committed to Congolese unity, to 
become the UN's representative in Elizabethville and carry out this task. 
While O'Brien thought that it would be possible for the UN to 
560n the changes occasioned by Kennedy's accession to office, see 
Weissman, pp.116-19 and 138-39. 
57Weissman, p.205 . 
58/bid ., pp .201-20, 215-16 and 229 . 
59 Ibid ., pp.244 -47 . 
60-faken from Operative Paragraph 2 of Resolution S/4741, passed on 21 
February 1961. 
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expel the Belgian officers and mercenaries from Katanga without resort 
to force, he felt that he had authority under the various UN resolutions 
to do so if necessary. 61 O'Brien undertook two military operations to 
expel the mercenaries and impose the authority of the UN in preparation 
for a return of central government authority. The first of these 
operations (code-named "Rumpunch") was bloodless, but succeeded only 
in expelling some of the foreign mercenaries. The second operation 
("Morthor"), in September 1961, led to heavy fighting between UN 
forces and the Katangan "gendarmerie. "62 It was in the aftermath of this 
episode that Hammarskjold decided to fly to Elizabethville to negotiate 
again with Tshombe, and on the night of 17 September, his plane 
mysteriously crashed some ten miles from the airport, killing all of 
those aboard. Subsequently, O'Brien was fiercely attacked in the 
Western media for provoking the use of force in Katanga, and he 
ultimately resigned in protest so that he could speak out against the 
UN's lack of resolve. 
"Morthor" and Hammarskjold's death led the Security Council to 
pass still another Resolution (S/5002) on 24 November, which, for the 
first time, condemned the rebellious Katangan government by name. It 
also made explicit the authority that had so long been in dispute . 
Article 4 stated that 
[The Security Council] [a]uthorizes the Secretary-
General to take vigorous action, including the 
requisite use of force, if necessary, for the immediate 
apprehension, detention pending legal action and/or 
deportation of all foreign military and para-military 
personnel and political advisers [in Katanga] ... 63 
It took Hammarskjold's replacement, U. Thant , some time to get settled 
into his new position, and in the interim, the UN sponsored an 
interminable round of negotiations between Adoula and Tshombe . 
When these made no headway, Thant announced a plan in August 1962 
to re-incorporate Katanga, which threatened Tshombe's government 
with a total boycott of Katangan minerals if it did not accept the central 
government's authority. 64 When these sanctions were imposed as 
promised, the situation in Katanga began to deteriorate, and fighting in 
December broke out between the UN forces stationed there and 
Tshombe's gendarmerie. The UN forces there took advantage of these 
61 O'Brien, pp.102 and 212. 
62 Also on these events, see Gerard -Libois , Chap.6 , "The Trials of 
Strength in the Second Half of 1961." 
63Emphasis added. 
64 See Gerard -Libois, Chap . 8, "The Thant Plan for National 
Reconciliation ." 
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skirmishes to occupy the key centers in Katanga, and drive out the 
remnants of the mercenary corps. 65 In this way, the long secession 
finally ended at the end of 1962. 
Further Evaluation of the ONUC Mission 
The description of any set of events, and certainly a set of events as 
complex as those encompassing the ONUC's mission between 1960-
64, necessarily entails subtle or not-so-subtle evaluations of those 
events. The description offered above is intended to be as neutral as 
possible, though those familiar with the events in the Congo between 
1960-64 and afterwards, harboring a range of political and ideological 
predispositions, will inevitably find some aspects unsatisfying. Yet the 
description of events, i.e., getting the facts right and culling the highly-
relevant from the less-relevant, is only the beginning of the difficulty of 
making an evaluation of the ONUC mission (or of any foreign policy 
initiative). Additionally, one must consider at least three other 
questions: (1) Against what set of goals should the ONUC mission be 
judged? (2) What would have happened in the Congo had the ONUC 
mission not been organized? and (3) What alternatives to the mission 
were there for the UN or for various states at the time of the Congo 
crisis? 
Bearing these considerations in mind allows one to appreciate the 
great range of judgements that have been made of the ONUC mission. 
At one end of the spectrum was the conservative opinion that the UN 
mission went far beyond its mandate in suppressing the establishment 
of Katanga as a separate state.66 This certainly was the view of the 
Belgian industrialists who controlled the mineral resources of Katanga . 
Towards the same end of the spectrum, many American policy-makers 
in Washington, and Timberlake in Leopoldville, believed that the 
Soviet Union had well-defined, aggressive designs to establish a close 
relationship with Lumumba, and possibly to transform his vague anti-
imperialism into a rigorously-Marxist mode of thought. 67 They also 
thought Lumumba was quite susceptible to such a result, regarding him 
as unstable, radical by nature and firmly anti-Western. This group 
approved of the ONUC in general, but frequently regretted specific 
decisions that it took, especially after September when Dayal attempted 
65See Gerard -Libois, Chap.9, "The Final Trial of Force." 
66This view was expressed, for instance, by Arthur Krock in the New 
York Times, 4 December 1964, cited in LeFever, p.171. 
67Besides Kalb, Chaps . 1 and 2, see on this matter Michael Schatzberg's 
Mobutu or Chaos? The United States and Zaire, 1960-1990, (Lanham, Md.: 
Univ. Press of America, 1991). Though derivative of many other earlier 
works on U.S.-Zairian relations, this work provides a useful "short-take" on 
official Washington attitudes towards the Congo crisis and Lumumba . 
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to put the ONUC on a more genuinely neutral tack between Lumumba 
and his rivals. Had Lumumba remained in power, this group would 
certainly have judged the ONUC mission a failure. 
At the other end of the spectrum was the Soviet view that the 
ONUC was an instrument of American foreign policy, i.e., of imperi-
alism from the moment that it entered the Congo. The extraordinary 
scorn heaped on Hammarskjbld and the UN in the Soviet press during 
this time is still striking. 68 Some American observers have argued 
similarly, if less rhetorically, that American policy was the slave of 
capital interests, and that the ONUC mission became little more than 
an instrument of American policy. 69 The attitude of many strong 
African nationalists has also been quite similar.70 The focus of these 
writers' disgust was the ONUC's apparent paternalism towards Africans, 
its failure to take Lumumba seriously as the Congolese leader, despite 
his widespread popularity, and its domination by Western diplomats in 
the highest posts. Not as shrill, and more effectively critical is the 
commentary of Thomas Kanza, who served as Lumumba's ambassador 
to the UN in 1960.71 Kanza demonstrated great equanimity in his 
discussion of the roots of the Congo crisis, arguing, for instance that 
"the tragedy unfolding in the Congo could be traced to the total absence 
of any mental decolonization among the Belgians and the total lack of 
any leadership among the Congolese capable of securing power 
effectively. "72 Unlike those who lionized Hammarskjbld, Kanza 
recognized the flaws of the Secretary-General, as well as his virtues.73 
In keeping with these personal evaluations, and his negative view of 
Cordier's role, Kanza certainly felt that the ONUC mission had failed to 
respect its mandate, which was to aid the Congolese government (then 
led by Lumumba). 
68See, e.g ., the articles reprinted in CDSP, XII, nos. 28-32, covering the 
period from mid-July through August 1960, including those cited above. 
69Besides Weissman, the first to argue the theory that U.S. policy was 
secretly controlled by corporate interests , this view was recently echoed by 
David N. Gibbs in his book, The Political Economy of Third World 
Intervention : Mines, Money, and U.S . Policy in the Congo Crisis, 
(Chicago : Univ. of Chicago Press, 1991). 
70 E.g ., Washington Okumu, Lumumba's Congo: Roots of Conflict, 
(New York: Ivan Obolensky, 1963) and D. Katete Orwa, The Congo 
Betrayal : The UN-US and Lumumba, (Nairobi: Kenya Literature Bureau, 
1985) . 
71 See note 43, supra . Kanza proved himself extremely diplomatic, 
articulate and capable at his U .N. appearances in 1960, far more so, in fact, 
than the Belgian representative. 
120p . cit., p .221. Emphasis added. 
73 For some of Kanza's important observations on Lumumba and 
Hammarskjold, see op. cit ., pp.238-263 . Kanza had a similarly balanced 
view of Lumumba's greatness and short-comings . 
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The strongest supporters of the ONUC mission have been certain 
"moderates" in the establishment foreign policy circles of several 
Western states, including many with some role in the mission itself. 
For instance, King Gordon, who served as the ONUC's Chief 
Information Officer until August 1962 offered this interim appraisal in 
late 1962: 
The amazing thing about ONUC has been that in the 
face of incredible difficulties and frustrations it has 
discharged its central purposes so well. ONUC was 
called into being because the Congo was thought to 
constitute a threat to international peace and security. 
In spite of the constant maneuverings of the great 
powers and reflections of the cold war in internal and 
external politics, ONUC's fiJling the vacuum headed 
off major conflict. 74 
Ernest Lefever, who worked as a researcher for the Brookings Institute 
and as a government consultant, later expressed a similar view after the 
ONUC mission was over: 
[The ONUC] sometimes fumbled. It made many 
small mistakes. It was assailed on all sides. It 
precipitated a financial crisis for the United Nations. 
But in the final analysis, the UN Force must be 
judged by its contribution to international stability, 
regardless of what other interest it might have served. 
So judged, the mission succeeded. It contributed to 
peace and security in Central Africa and in the wider 
world.75 
Lefever's conclusion rests explicitly on his contentions that (1) all the 
14 The United Nations in the Congo: A Quest for Peace, (New York: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962), pp.182 -83. One 
should note that not all of the mission's participants ended their service to 
the U .N. with such feelings, however. O'Brien's book, cited above, 
contains a sharp and well-argued critique of the ONUC. 
15Crisis in the Congo: A United Nations Force in Action, (Wash-
ington: Brookings, 1965), p.181. Cf. the (similar) conclusions of Ernest 
Lefever and Wynfred Joshua, United Nations Peacekeeping in the Congo: 
1960-1964: An Analysis of Political, Executive and Military Control, vol. 
2 (Full Text), (Washington: Brookings, 1966), pp.394-434. Lefever 
forthrightly acknowledges in his 1965 book, however, that the course of 
events in the Congo served the interests of the U.S. in its cold war contest 
with the Soviet Union. 
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other options for dealing with the crisis--which he limits to unilateral 
interventions by specific states: Belgium, an African group of states, 
the Soviet Union or the U.S.--were less desirable; (2) the operation was 
true to its mandate and (3) the operation was reasonably successful. 
Much of the liberal, Western establishment doubtless continues to view 
the ONUC mission in such a lighL 
Perhaps, though, we can now "banish both the eulogistic 
glorifications as well as the summary critiques" of the ONUC's record, 
as one wise observer suggested in 1967.76 In regard, to the ONUC's 
mandate to speed the withdrawal of the Belgian troops, for instance, its 
record is decidedly mixed. Though the Belgians did withdraw from most 
of the Congo rapidly, their continued presence in Katanga after 1960 
contributed greatly to the prolongation of the province's secession. One 
might be tempted to argue that, had the UN not intervened, then the 
Belgians would have taken longer to withdraw, but this assumes the 
same actions by the U.S., and no intervention by the Soviet Union. 
Yet more vigorous Soviet unilateral intervention would have been 
likely if the ONUC mission had not been organized. Or, if the United 
States had joined the Soviet Union in demanding such a withdrawal, 
Belgium might have ordered aJI her nationals home more quickly. In 
reference to Katanga, those who favored the re-integration of the 
province may either praise the ONUC for its ultimate decisiveness, or 
regret the long interval between its entry into the Congo and its action 
against the Tshombe regime. 
Likewise, in regard to the restoration of order, one must judge the 
UN's success mixed. In the short term, some relative order was restored 
to the Congo. Yet the Western view has over-estimated the amount of 
"disorder" that the Congo was suffering in July 1960, which was in fact 
minimal, before the arrival of the Belgians. This suggests that order 
might have been restored in Congo without the UN if Belgium had 
shown more patience. And accordingly, perhaps the relative return to 
order had more to do with the withdrawal of the Belgian troops than 
with the UN's presence. In tum, the withdrawal of the Belgians might 
have been accomplished in other ways besides the dispatch of the 
ONUC, as suggested above. In the long term, order, repressive though 
it has been, was only restored in the Congo by Joseph Mobutu and the 
ANC. 
As for Gordon's observation that the ONUC "headed off major 
conflict," one can only find it rather ironic. If the West did not consider 
the Congo crisis a major superpower crisis, the Soviets certainly did. 
Their vituperation could scarcely have been stronger, and they came 
close to ceasing all cooperation with the UN after the failure of their 
"troika proposal." Each superpower intervened--the U.S. covertly and 
76Gendebien, p.259. Author's translation . 
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the Soviets quietly--in the Congo on behalf of factions that it favored. 
Nor does it appear that it was the ONUC which prevented the Soviets 
from intervening more forcefully. Though world opinion may have 
been a minor consideration for the Soviets, the deterrent power of the 
American military was far more important. Given their level of 
frustration with the ONUC's activities, the Soviets would not likely 
have refrained from intervention in the face of world public opinion 
alone. Thus, while one may speculate that the Soviet-American 
confrontation over Congo might have been worse had the ONUC 
mission not been organized, such speculation depends on the judgment 
that the Soviets would have acted irrationally in the face of the then-
existing American military superiority. 
As to Hammarskjold's pledge that the ONUC would be neutral in 
the Congo's internal affairs, later incorporated in several resolutions on 
the Congo crisis, at least two observations should be made. First, the 
principle contradicts the main activating clause in the first resolution on 
the Congo crisis, the resolution which organized the ONUC. That 
resolution indicates that the purpose of the ONUC is to help the 
Congolese government, not to mediate between warring factions. As a 
result of the ONUC's subsequent practice in the Congo in the name of 
this principle, Lumumba, many other Congolese, and the Soviets felt 
that the UN came to the Congo under false pretenses. The second 
observation about this pledge is that it proved, predictably, impossible 
to keep. In the course of disarming soldiers or closing airports towards 
the end of "restoring order," the ONUC inevitably effected the military 
fortunes of the factions struggling for control in the Congo. 
It is because of this mixed record of the ONUC, judged by its many 
mandates, that the mission's supporters can find so much to praise in it, 
and its detractors so much to blame. The nature of these judgments 
points again to the overriding lesson that the contemporary world 
should take from the ONUC experience: Since the mandate of the 
ONUC was so unclear, and even contradictory, virtually no one was 
satisfied with its actions in the Congo. A number of corollary lessons 
accompany this general point. First, where the mandate of the UN is 
unclear, a great deal of responsibility will rest with the Secretary-
General, which was certainly the case in the Congo. Second, there are 
likely to be contests among the senior UN staff to have their own 
reading of the mandate become the accepted one. Third, one cannot 
expect the UN to act with particular swiftness or certitude in a local 
setting. Fourth, where outside powers have parochial interests in, or 
emotional ties to, events in the local setting, they are likely to 
undertake unilateral interventions if their understanding of the mandate 
is not followed. Fifth, if the permanent members of the Security 
Council read an unclear mandate in different ways, and the UN follows 
one interpretation over another, then the apparent, but unreal, consensus 
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of the Council may break down. A number of other, related corollaries 
could be drawn from the ONUC experience using this reasoning. 
Lessons for Contemporary UN Missions 
Since there is frequently disagreement among members of the 
Council, even after the end of the Cold War, it may not, of course, 
always be possible to get a strong mandate from the UN for specific 
actions. In these situations, the real choice may be a UN mission with 
a weak mandate, or none at all. For instance, in the Bosnian crisis, it 
is apparent that Russia sympathizes more with the Serbians than the 
other permanent members, which is one reason that the UN has a weak 
mandate there. As in the Congo case, the UN is trying to remain 
neutral among the warring sides, and is attempting to negotiate a 
settlement among them. The heroic work of individual UN units in 
Bosnia notwithstanding, however, there is a real danger that the UN has 
or may become an "enabler." Like the person who mitigates the 
terrible consequences of his spouse's alcoholism, and thereby 
inadvertently perpetuates the problem, the UN in Bosnia has modestly 
relieved the suffering of many civilians, while failing to address the 
underlying problem. The enabler also delays or deters other outside 
intervention in the situation. 
The ONUC experience and this analysis suggests that it is time, 
perhaps, for the UN to choose sides in Bosnia, and the "side" that it 
should choose is obvious: the Bosnian government This government 
not only has considerable international recognition, but also is open to 
people of all religious backgrounds, Muslim, Catholic and Orthodox. 
Logistically, the UN could certainly organize and dispatch to Bosnia a 
military force capable of successfully aiding the Bosnian government to 
establish its control over its territory. The problems with this 
approach, though, are not primarily logistical, but political, 
specifically, lack of courage in Western Europe and the U.S., and 
sympathy for the Serbs in Russia. Perhaps these political problems 
cannot be overcome, but if this is the case, then perhaps the UN should 
simply withdraw. Then unilateral aid could flow in to the Bosnia 
government from sympathetic Middle Eastern states and elsewhere. As 
things stand, the UN justifies a ban on aid to all parties on the ground 
of its presence in Bosnia. 
As in Bosnia, the work of the UN in Somalia has been 
extraordinary in its humanitarian accomplishments. Despite the virtual 
absence of press coverage of its achievements in Somalia, the UN 
mission there saved uncountable thousands of Somalis from starvation 
during 1993. Yet the UN's more recent difficulties in Somalia reflect 
the same weakness of mandate that troubled the ONUC and now 
troubles the UN mission to Bosnia. The obvious solution is for the 
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UN to organize a plebiscite for a new Somali constitution, and a series 
of elections for the people to choose new leaders . With a new 
government in place, the UN would have a tangible and reasonably 
legitimate entity to support in Somalia. Unless the UN can 
accomplish this task--and it is not suggested here that it will be 
straight-forward or simple--then the future of the UN's role in Somalia 
is unclear. To remain in perpetuity in interposition between a variety 
of Somali opponents is an outcome that can satisfy few. Nor, as in 
Cyprus, where the UN has established itself as an unending buffer 
between the ethnically Turkish and Greek communities, does it appear 
feasible that the UN can permanently keep the Somali factions apart. 
In the case of Haiti, the UN seems to have recognized better that it 
cannot at once intervene in the country's internal affairs, and remain 
neutral between General Cedras and the Reverend Jean-Bertrand Aristide. 
Now, with the international aspects of the Haiti crisis being few, the 
UN appears to have limited its actions to an embargo . While this 
decision no doubt grieves Mr. Aristide and his supporters, at least it 
was a relatively decisive one. 
One should be careful not to take the point made here too far. 
Sometimes the UN humanitarian actions in the midst of political 
crises, like facilitating the relief of the Somali famine, or the 
dismantling of concentration camps in Bosnia, are extremely valuable. 
If the UN is to be taken more seriously as a political instrument, 
however, as the post-Cold War situation promises, then perhaps it is 
time for its missions to become more precise and more definitive . This 
would certainly raise the UN's credibility with would-be international 
aggressors and tyrants. Collective security has never been the weak-
kneed alternative to unilateral intervention that its critics have portrayed 
it to be. When employed decisively, as in the Persian Gulf, it can be 
an effective instrument of the international community against 
aggression . One of the great questions of the post-Cold War world is 
whether the international community is now prepared to use collective 
intervention decisively in cases that are primarily internal. If not, then 
the world community must become more alert to the possibility that 
the UN will become an enabler to violence where it intervenes half-
heartedly. Though the determination to support decisive uses of UN 
force in conflicts that are essentially domestic is difficult, it is on such 
determinations that the future of the UN rests. 
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